ETRM & Markets

In 2010, Colorado Gov. Bill Ritter signed the Clean Air-Clean Jobs Act, which, among other things, explicitly encouraged long-term gas supply contracts. The law specified procedures for commission approval and discouraged subsequent look-back by future commissions.

In April 2012, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission approved a competitive procurement rule that created new opportunities to enter long-term contracts for natural gas and other fuels. The rule created “an open, transparent, fair, and nondiscriminatory competitive bidding process” that would enable Oklahoma utilities to obtain a presumption of prudency for approved agreements.³

A report recently released by the National Regulatory Research Institute noted the proactive measures taken by Colorado, Oklahoma, and Oregon to promote long-term natural gas contracts, while the majority of state commissions provide little guidance.⁴ – GS and PB

FERC Order 1000 listed six principles for cost allocation for interregional transmission planning. FERC’s list, however, could be expanded as follows:

1) Commensurate with Benefits: The cost of interregional transmission projects should be allocated to regions such that they are at least roughly commensurate with total benefits identified for each of the regions based on the benefits and metrics specified. Neither region should be allocated a share of the cost of an interregional project in which it receives no benefit.

2) Transparency: The application of cost allocation methodologies and identification of benefits and beneficiaries must be transparent.

3) Different project types: Different cost allocation methods may be applied to different types (e.g., reliability, economic, or public policy requirements) or different portions of transmission facilities.

4) Quantify and Monetize: The identified benefits should be quantified and, if possible, monetized based on all internally used and additionally specified interregional benefit metrics. Non-monetized and non-quantified benefits should also be recognized in the assessment of the overall reasonableness of proposed interregional project cost allocations.

5) Benefits at Least Equal to Avoided Costs: The regions should agree that the monetized reliability, load serving, public policy, or other benefit of an interregional project will be at least equal to the avoided cost of achieving the same benefit solely through cost-effective local or regional transmission upgrades.

6) Hurdle Rate: If benefit-to-cost ratios are used to assess the desirability of an interregional project to a region or the regions as a group, the benefit-to-cost threshold must not exceed 1.25.

7) Regional Net Benefits: Benefits to each region need to be sufficiently large so that each region’s share of benefits exceeds its share of costs consistent with region-internal benefit-cost criteria.

8) Internal Cost Recovery: The costs allocated to each region must be recoverable through the existing internal—local and regional—cost allocation process of each region.–JP, JWC, and DH